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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/05/2006

Accident number: 379

Accident time: 14:00

Accident Date: 13/06/2002

Where it occurred: M/F 505, Bal'awin,
Bayt Yahun

Country: Lebanon

Primary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Demolition accident

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)
Date of main report: 17/07/2002

ID original source: BOI:No004/2002

Name of source: MACC SL

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: No.4 Israel AP blast /
frag

Ground condition: bushes/scrub
grass/grazing area
rocks/stones

Date record created: 22/02/2004

Date last modified: 23/03/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: M/F 505

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)
incomplete detonation (?)
inadequate training (?)

Accident report
A summarised MACC BOI report was made available in 2003. It is reproduced below, edited
for anonymity. The commercial demining company involved was asked to supply the internal
report referenced in this document in March 2003.
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Introduction
1. At the time of the accident a Manual Clearance Team were operational on M/F 505
clearance site, at Bal’awin, Bayt Yahun. The Manual Clearance Team had been operational
on M/F 505 since the 24th May 2002. A total of 1 x breaching lane (base lane), 2 x exploration
lanes and the main clearance lanes had been cut into M/F 505 during the previous 17 x days
clearance activities, resulting in the location of the minefield mine rows, as per the M/F
records.
2. Prior to the accident all demining operations had actually ceased and the Team were in
the process of destroying the days located mines and UXO (63 x Israeli No.4 Anti-Personnel
mines, 2 x 60mm Mortar Bomb and 1 x 52mm Mortar Bomb). The Team Leader had prepared
the explosive charges using approximately 2oz of Gelatine Explosives for each mine, all
linked with a detonating cord “Main Line”; the Gelatine Explosive being directly compressed
on to the Detonating Cord with no “Branch Lines” being used. For the first demolition serial, a
total number of 32 Israeli No.4 Anti-Personnel mines were prepared.
3. At approximately 13:43 hours, the signal “Fire in the Hole” was passed from the Team to
[commercial demining group] base location and the demolition serial was conducted.
Following a short time period, to allow the debris to stop falling and the smoke to dissipate the
Team Leader moved forward alone to check for complete detonation of the serial,
systematically checking each crater in turn.
4. At approximately 14:00, hrs an uncontrolled detonation in a previously cleared area
occurred, whilst the Team Leader was checking the area. Initially the Team Leader thought
that the uncontrolled detonation was a rifle shot, as local hunters had been operating the
general area. He then felt a pain in his buttocks and on investigation found that his buttocks
were bleeding. He then made his way out of the minefield to the Command Post where his
injuries were treated by Team Medic.

Medical details
5. The Team Leader suffered bruising and minor abrasions to both buttocks. Treatment was
conducted on-site and at [commercial demining group] base location. The Team Leader was
also taken to Bint Jubayl hospital for an Anti-Tetanus injection.

Conclusions
6. Based on the investigation, the statements and visits to the site, the BOI concludes the
following:
•

There was a surface uncontrolled detonation of an Israeli No.4 Anti Personnel mine
Igniter, the Igniter detonated after the Team Leader inadvertently stood on it.

•

Prior to the uncontrolled detonation of the Israeli No.4 Anti Personnel mine Igniter,
during the demolition serial there was a partial detonation of the Israeli No.4 Anti
Personnel mine. Evidence shows that the crater was relatively shallow, no lifting had
formed around the edges and a large quantity of the mine body and mine explosives
were recovered by the BOI.

•

The reasons for the partial detonation are:
•

The Gelatine explosive (Nitro-Glycerine based) has a high “Brisance”
(Shattering effect), this being ideal for quarrying applications but not ideal
when the transfer of the detonation wave from a donor charge to a mine /
UXO is required.

•

Using a single piece of detonating cord to try and ensure that the detonating
wave is transferred to any donor charge is insufficient; it simply lacks the
secondary high explosive concentrated enhancement, that is required to
ensure the wave transfer.
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•

The 2 oz Gelatine donor explosive charge used is insufficient to ensure that
the detonating wave is transferred to an explosive charge in a mine (the
detonating pressure of Gelatine is less than half of PE4).

•

The bruising and abrasions to the Team Leader’s buttocks was due to both primary
and secondary fragmentation resulting from the part disintegration of the Israeli No.4
mine Igniter, on the detonation of the primary high explosive fill.

•

The post-accident marking of the accident site was carried out in accordance with
current SOPs.

•

The passage of information in between the accident site, [commercial demining
group] base location and the MACC SL was very good, with all relevant information
being passed in a timely manner.

•

The BOI agrees and accepts [commercial demining group] Accident and IMSMA
Reports.

•

The number of mines cleared by Team No 4 to date by far exceeds the number of
mines as reported on the IF record and MACC SL Minefield Report. M/F 505 may not
actually be the correct designation of this minefield.

Recommendations
7. The following are recommendations based on the BOI conclusions:
•

When using detonating cord as an intermediary charge and prior to it being placed in
the main explosive charge, 300mm should be folded back and a double knot be tied
at the end. This concentration of PETN will ensure that the detonating wave is
transferred to the main explosive charge. The main explosive charge should be
broken down into 1/3 and 2/3 segments, the knotted detonating cord should then be
placed into the 2/3 segment and then the 1/3 segment compressed on top. In order to
ensure that the majority of the detonating wave is directed towards the mine, the 2/3
segment should be placed as close to the mine (see overleaf). If TNT blocks are
being used then a minimum of 4 x detonating cord turns around the block should be
used in order to ensure the transfer of the detonating wave.

•

[Crude computer sketch deleted.]

•

“Branch Lines” should be used, when conducting demolitions using either the “Main
Line” or “Ring Main” detonating cord principles.

•

Main Line junctions should be made with a clove hitch, detonator clip or 100mm
intimate tape contact.

•

[Crude computer sketch deleted.]

•

Note that the same principle is applied to “Ring Mains”, whether they be outer or inner
“Ring Mains”.

•

During the post-demolition serial check, Team Leaders are to check each and every
seat of detonation systematically at a safe distance, should doubt exist that there has
not been a complete detonation then the immediate area should be systematically
cleared using normal manual clearance drills.

•

Amendments be made to [commercial demining group] SOPs to include the above 3
x recommendations.

•

No further issues of the Gelatine explosives be made, until further notice.

•

No amendments are necessary to the National TSG’s for Mine/UXO Clearance.

•

The conclusions detailed in this report be distributed and discussed among all
[commercial demining group] Operational Field Staff.

•

MACC SL to investigate the correct M/F designator.
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Signed: QA Officer, Mine Action Co-ordination Centre Southern Lebanon

Victim Report
Victim number: 496

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: Not made available
(insured HMT)

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Not recorded

Protection used: not recorded

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Legs
COMMENT
No medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate training” because the Victim
prepared a demolition in a manner that was unlikely to be successful. The Victim was a Team
Leader and seems to have been inadequately prepared for his tasks, so the secondary cause
is listed as a “Management/control inadequacy”.
The accident report is noted as “inadequate” because the “summarised” report does not
include sufficient detail in critical areas. It is possible that the full report would correct these
failings. The summarised report does not record the time taken for the Victim to receive
hospital treatment or what PPE was being worn. The report does not specify the fuze type
found on other mines in the area, so identifying which type of No.4 fuze was likely to have
been involved in the accident. Further, the report does not include the demining group’s
internal report or witness statements which can help when wanting to later assess and
confirm the chain of events.

4

